Introduction
During the last two decades, we have been witnessing a growing interest as well as a remarkable activity in connection to paraconsistent logic. So many specialized publications appearing, international congresses being held, and research papers advancing considerably the theory could not but con rm the highly favorable environment conditions for this new kind of logic. More recently, however, in addition to the well-known contributions to the issues linked to the foundations of mathematics, paraconsistent logic has found a fruitful (and, for sure, amazing) new eld of application: Computer Science! Indeed, specially within Arti cial Intelligence, in order to face theoretical di culties raised by inconsistent data base, paraconsistent tools have been successfully applied. As a result, new paraconsistent systems have been developed, opening thus new research elds, as well as the way to potentially interesting applications.
Our aim in this rather expository paper is to present, in an outline, some of the main features of a logic of inconsistent but non-trivial systems. There are, in fact, in nitely many paraconsistent logics, and in what follows we shall examine mainly one of them, a speci c paraconsistent propositional logic called C + 2. HISTORICAL ASPECTS 599
is 13], entitled`Calculs propositionnels pour les syst emes formels inconsistants' (although his work on the subject had begun several years before). For a long time, da Costa used the expression`syst emes formels inconsistants' to refer to his systems, until a friend of his, F. Mir o Quesada, under his request, proposed in correspondence with him and in a lecture during the Third Latin-American Symposium of Mathematical Logic (held in Campinas, in 1976) the name`paraconsistent logic'. Many years later (see 16] ), da Costa would describe how this name has miraculously contributed to the development of the subject, leading eventually to the opening, in 1991, of a new section in the Mathematical Reviews (03B53).
However, some criticisms have been addressed to this terminology; for instance, in his review of some of the papers included in 34], F. G. Asenjo notes:`the expression \paraconsistent logic" . . . is largely a misnomer. The term has a misleading publicrelations timidity about it, having been introduced to avoid the arousing the negative re exes triggered by the word \inconsistency" ' (see 6], p. 1503). This problem is certainly not a simple one, and is related to the philosophical problematic of knowing if paraconsistent logic is rival or complementary to classical logic. Some have clearly brought paraconsistent logic in the direction of a complementary logic, but the other trend is also a vivid one (cf. 34]). (See Section 5 below for a discussion.)
In his 1963 paper, da Costa presented the paraconsistent logic C 1 (and a related hierarchy of similar logics). Later, he would develop rst-order calculi, description calculi and set theories based on these calculi. But he has formulated not only these paraconsistent logics of type C, but many others as well. He has also not worked alone, but has founded a`school' of paraconsistent logic in Brazil. Moreover, he has worked with the Polish logicians J. Kotas and L. Dubikatjis, and with them has developed a systematic study of Jaskowski's problem (see, for instance 29]). With A. I. Arruda and L. Z. Puga, he has worked on a modern formalization of Vasil' ev's system (see, for example, 36]).
Da Costa has not only contributed to the birth and development of paraconsistent logic as an autonomous eld of research in mathematics by creating new systems, but also by organizing the subject, and tracing back its`forerunners' and making their work better known.
The logic C 1 (and some connected ones) is one of the most studied and best known paraconsistent logic. A great number of papers have been published about it, especially (but not only) in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. This logic was rst presented as a system of deduction of a Hilbert-type (cf. 13]). A few years later, A. R. Raggio, in 38] , tried to formulate a Gentzen-type sequent system, but did not succeed. It was only recently that J.-Y. B eziau gave such a version, with the corre- The idea of C 1 was to provide a logic which is paraconsistent, but as close as possible to classical propositional logic. If we consider the full usual language of propositional calculus (i.e. the connectives :, !,^, _), this means that all properties (independent of negation) of !,^, _ must be preserved. In other words, we want a conservative extension of the positive classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, the negation : must be a paraconsistent negation, in the sense that there is at least a theory T from which we can deduce a formula a and its`negation' :a (T is inconsistent), but such that there is a formula b which cannot be deduced from T (T is non-trivial). The term paraconsistent is also used to qualify such a theory.
Furthermore, this negation should, if possible, have all the properties of classical negation compatible with these features.
It is not easy to deal with this compromise. It is di cult indeed to analyze all the problems related to it. Notwithstanding this, we shall present here two possibilities.
(1) A logic such as Johannson's minimal logic ts into this de nition of paraconsistent logic, but no one wants to consider it as such; in fact, within this system, from an inconsistent theory it is possible to deduce the negation of any formula (to avoid this di culty, Urbas has introduced the concept of strict paraconsistency; cf. 39]). (2) It seems that, on this basis, some strong meta-properties will never be met; such as, for instance, the replacement theorem.
The best to do is perhaps to study these problems in a concrete case. In C 1 , the negation seems to be strong enough to deserve this name; for example, it obeys ::a ! a, a _ :a, and one quarter of De Morgan's laws (see 8]). We may intend, however, to strengthen C 1 without reaching a logic such as Johannson's, where a contradiction relatively trivializes the system. The main drawback of C 1 is that the replacement theorem does not hold. Thus, we may intend to extend C 1 not only to get more theorems, but also to get more metatheorems (such as this one). However, this may turn out not to be possible; at least, no attempt on this direction has been successful until now. The basic idea of C 1 is that the weak paraconsistent negation has the following two properties: (1) a^ a obeys the principle of contradiction (this provides a strong classical negation :); and (2) We have chosen here to use the symbol tilde to denote the paraconsistent negation 3. THE PARACONSISTENT LOGIC C + 1 601 and the usual symbol (in present day) : to denote the classical negation de nable in C + 1 in terms of the weak one. This precaution has been taken in order not to confuse the reader by attributing a new signi cation to the usual symbol of negation. In general, in the literature, it is common to use the same symbol to denote classical negation, intuitionistic negation, minimal negation, etc., even if there is no absolute de nition of what a negation is, and in particular it is not made explicit what the properties are which distinguish a negation from a unary operator such as a modal operator.
At the end of the preceding section, we have followed this way of approaching the issue, by using the usual name and symbol for negation to speak about a paraconsistent negation, even if it was not clear in which sense this negation deserves the name. An interesting attempt to deal with this problem is to be found in 39].
In a logic, there may be two operators or more, which deserves the name negation. Thus, of course, the quali cation paraconsistent is to be relativized to each of these negations. In other words, a logic is paraconsistent if there is a negation in which it is a paraconsistent one. Remark 3.2 There are several ways to interpret the informal sentence`a obeys the principle of contradiction'. One possibility is:`:(a^:a) is a thesis'; another one:`from a and :a we can derive anything'; a third one:`if a is true, then :a is false'. In C + 1 these three interpretations are equivalent in the sense that using one or another, we get the same logic; the same arises in C 1 The negation in C + 1 as in C 1 is neither truth-functional nor extensional (in the sense that the replacement theorems does not hold). However, a bivalent semantics can be provided. This kind of semantics was the birth of the theory of valuation, initiated by N. C. A. da Costa (see 19, 20] ). Remark 3.3 It may seem strange to say that a logic in which the replacement theorem does not hold is not extensional because a lot of logics in which this theorem holds are called intensional (this is typically the case of the standard modal logics; see e.g. 27]). However, this terminology from a philosophical point of view seems inadequate and probably is the consequence of the confusion between truth-functionality and extensionality. This terminology is directly inspired by the one of Wojcicki. Furthermore, even a logic which is not extensional in our sense does not necessarily deserve the adjective`intensional'; for example, we do not think that C + 1 (or C 1 ) is an intensional logic (for a discussion on this topic see 11]).
Morphology
We consider an absolute free algebra of propositions: P = hP ; h ;^; _; ii of type h1; 2; 2; 2i; will be called the weak negation and^; _ and will be termed conjunction, disjunction and implication, respectively. ATOM P is the set of generators and the elements of ATOM are called atomic propositions. We will write a; b; : : : elements of P; T; T 0 ; : : : subsets of P; ?; ; : : : nite subsets of P. We de ne the following unary compound function (strong negation): :a = a^ (a^ a); and the function from P to P: (a) = a; for a 2 ATOM, (a ? b) = (a)? (b); for? 2 f^; _; g; and nally ( a) = :( (a)). This last function is then extended to a function from the power set of P into itself: (T ) = f (a); a 2 Tg.
We will use k a Proof. Immediate using r and the cut rule. Theorem 3.6 The following schemes are valid in C + 1 :
The schemes on the right are not valid in C 1 .
Proof. We give just one example; the others follow in a similar way:
We have: (1) and (2) we can proceed as follows: Cut elimination holds for C + 1 .
Proof. Similar as the proof for C 1 . See 9]. The semantical deductibility relation`V+ is de ned as usual. . We will present such kind of tables in a more precise manner for the bivalent semantics in Section 3.5.1 below. Each line must be interpreted as a condition the elements of V + 3 should satisfy; i.e. for example, the rst line of the table states that an element t of V + 3 must satisfy the following condition: for every a and b, t(a) = h0 : 1i and t(b) = h0; 1i implies that t(a^b) = h0; 1i.
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For a discussion about this non truth-functional three-valued semantics and the usual many-valued semantics, the reader may consult 21].
The advantage of this semantics is that the values of a compound proposition depends, as in the classical case, only on its subpropositions.
Thus we have here an example of the usefulness of increasing the number of values even in a non truth-functional context.
It is out of the scope of this paper to present the abstract result of 10]. The idea, roughly speaking, is to preserve rightly the transformation set of designated values. This kind of transformation has been used in the case of matrix theory of Suzko to show how to reduce any many-valued matrix semantics into a bivalent (non truth-functional) semantics (see 31] pp. 72{73). J.-Y. B eziau in the above referred paper has extended this method to reduce a wider range of semantics (not necessarily given by matrix) to bivalent semantics. To do so he has established a more general result saying that if two semantics are epimorphic they induce the same logic (given a very general de nition of semantics and a corresponding notion of epimorphism). Furthermore, it is possible to use this result in a`reverse' way, as in the present case, to increase the number of values. 
Completeness
The completeness theorem can be proved exactly in the same way as in the case of C 1 (see 18]), the adaptation of the proof being very small if we rst transform the system S + into a Hilbert-type system, and this can be done also in a very similar way as in the case of the sequent system for C 1 presented in 9].
However, J.-Y. B eziau has recently proved a general result on the connection between sequent rules and conditions for bivaluations which, applying in a particular case like the ones of V + and S + , gives instantaneously the completeness theorem (see e.g. 12]).
It is out of the scope of this paper to present such a result, but we will say a word about it: this result shows that in the case of some particular sequent systems (those which are structurally standard in the sense that they contain the usual standard rules and that there is no particular restriction on the form of the sequent as in the case of the intuitionistic system LJ), the natural interpretation in terms of truth and falsity always holds. As the reader may check, the conditions for the bivaluations kil] are the direct translation, under this natural interpretation, of the rules kil. Each of the functions de ned by a line of the truth table can be extended to a function from P to f0, 1g which is a member of V + . Given a function 2 V + , its restriction to the sphere of b is identical to the function de ned by a line of the truth table.
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Proof. The proof is carried out in a similar way to the proof for C The following schemes are not valid in C + 1 : The replacement theorem does not hold for C + 1 .
C. Mortensen has shown that in C 1 it is not possible to de ne an equivalence relation which is not the identity (see 33]). C + 1 has the very interesting feature of having a non-trivial congruence that we call well-equivalence.
We say that a and b are logically equivalent (notation: a b) when for every 2 V + , (a) = (b).
A proposition a is said to be well-behaved when for every 2 V + , (a) = 1 ) ( a) = 0 Now we say that a and b are well-equivalent (notation: a ' b) if and only if they are both well-behaved and if they are logically equivalent. Lemma 3.20 If a proposition has a well-behaved subproposition, then it is well-behaved.
Proof. The proof is carried out by induction on the complexity of a proposition a. The case where a is an atom trivially holds because it has no well-behaved subproposition. If a is of the form b^:b, it also trivially holds because a is well-behaved. Now suppose that a = k a 1 ; : : : ; a p ]. If a has a well-behaved subproposition, it is either a direct subproposition of a or it is a subproposition of, at least, one a i (1 i p), then by the induction hypothesis there is, at least, one direct subproposition of a which is well-behaved. Thus, if a has a well-behaved subproposition, it has a direct well-behaved subproposition, from which we can conclude (by kil]) that a is well-behaved. iii) The other three cases are easy and are left to the reader. 4 Applications of paraconsistent logic
The usefulness of paraconsistent reasoning
There are many useful applications of paraconsistent logic for all kinds of reasoning, arti cial or natural. The advantages of employing this logic are obvious: in the pres-
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ence of a contradiction, we can go on making interesting reasonings (especially using a very strong paraconsistent logic like C + 1 ) without, as in classical logic, (1) supposing that one of the terms of the contradiction must be rejected or (2) deriving anything. Obviously, (2) is the dead end of logical reasoning, but (1) is, without luck, not better, for if we make the wrong choice there is no way out. And in many cases it is simply not possible to know which is the wrong choice and which is the right one. Maybe there is, in reality, no contradiction. But it seems that contradictions are enclosed in any important amount of complex knowledge. Perhaps these contradictions are only ctitious contradictions. But even if there is, now, in the present state of a airs, no way to solve these contradictions, it may be useful to deal with them, without the peril of direct triviality. We shall give here concrete examples of reasoning involving contradictions. We take the example of medicine, which has already been investigated in 23] using another paraconsistent logic di erent from the ones presented in this paper. Medicine is a subject of special interest, because it is not rare that two physicians give two di erent contradictory diagnostics for the same observable symptoms. This is not necessarily due to the incompetence of the physicians, but rather to the complexity of medicine. And thus this situation can also arise in the case of a MES (Medical Expert System).
Examples of paraconsistent reasonings in Medicine
John Smith is sick; he goes to Dr. Bouvard and this one tells him that he has got cancer. John Smith decides to consult another specialist, namely Dr. P ecuchet, who turns out to be categorical: he tells him that he has not got cancer.
Dr. P ecuchet does not agree with his colleague on this point and many others but there is at least one thing that they both recognize:
If John Smith has got cancer he will die in the next three months. John Smith is very bewildered, he thinks one of them must be wrong, but he does not know which one, because Dr. Bouvard is a very renowned physician and so is Dr. P ecuchet. Now we will show that if John Smith uses paraconsistent logic, he can make interesting reasonings, without supposing that Dr. P ecuchet or Dr. Bouvard is wrong.
Reasoning 1:
We will show that from the statement of Dr. Bouvard, the statement of Dr. P ecuchet and the statement they both agree on we cannot infer that:
If John Smith has not got cancer he will not die in the next three months. Let us use the following transcriptions: (a) John Smith has got cancer. (b) John Smith will die in the next three months.
Thus we will show that: fa; a; a bg 6 For every 2 V + , we have ( a^b) = 0; using r], we get: for every 2 V + , ( ( a^b)) = 1. Using the completeness theorem, we have:`C+ 1 ( a^b). We shall now give a proof of the sequent ( a^b) ! This reasoning is not only typical of C + 1 by contrast to C 1 , in the sense that it is not valid in C 1 ; but also by contrast to classical logic, in the sense that if we are in the presence of contradictions, there is no trivialization. That is to say, if we have furthermore a contradictory hypothesis, from the point of view of the weak negation , such as`C+ 1 c^ c; for example the sentence Dr. Bouvard is a quack and Dr.
Bouvard is not a quack.
What we can say about these two examples of reasoning is that, in presence of 5. SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS 611 5 Some philosophical remarks From a philosophical perspective, just as from a technical one, paraconsistent logic has also given rise to various, interesting considerations. However, by no means shall a comprehensive approach be proposed here. The following brief remarks are devised only to acquaint the reader with some already explored lines, leaving to further works a more detailed approach (for additional philosophical considerations, see 15], 35] and 37]).
At the outset, it should be clear that, despite being a non-classical logic, paraconsistent logic, from our viewpoint, does not constitute a tentative approach to challenge classical, standard logical conceptions { whose domain and main features are assured beyond any doubts. Rather, it was mainly devised in order to supply alternative tools, not found in the extant formalisms, so that some speci c mathematical and logical problems, not possibly addressed to within a classical framework, could be reasonably considered. For instance, in order to study semantical paradoxes in set theory, taking them at face value, and not trying (as usual) only to evade them, some paraconsistent machinery is called for. Similarly, the analysis of speci c principles in their full cogency { as, for example, the principle of comprehension in set theory or in higher order predicate logic { also demands considerations on paraconsistent grounds. Or else, a deeper understanding of some concepts, such as of negation, can be better attained through the employment of a paraconsistent framework ( 3] , pp. 11{12).These are just some possible examples to illustrate our point; there are, though, still many others that could be mentioned, if it were necessary.
More importantly, however, is perhaps to stress, once again, the parallel, from a conceptual point of view, between the creation of Non-Euclidean geometry and the rise of paraconsistent logic. Undeniably, both of them present, within mathematical and logical contexts, unquestionable relevance. Nevertheless, in addition to this, and opposed on this regard to many other scienti c theories, their philosophical signicance is also incontestable. In e ect, if non-classical geometries have a orded us a deeper understanding of some scienti c notions, non-classical logics in general, and paraconsistent logic in particular, have provided a crucial theoretical setting to grasp the true meaning of logicity. In both cases, the gain is enormous.
It also deserves to be remarked that paraconsistent logic can be further regarded (within the context of its applications as well as of its interpretation) from two different points of view: (1) as a logic complementary to classical logic (for instance, by interpreting its negations as connectives more general than classical negation); or (2) as a kind of heterodox logic, incompatible with classical logic, whose destiny is to replace the latter in all or some of its applications.
Determining which of these possibilities is the case in general, however, is something rather delicate. Indeed, such a question seems not to present a direct answer, for paraconsistent logic is not a uniform subject; we can, in fact, construct rival as well complementary paraconsistent logics. Moreover, to a certain extent, this issue cannot be established only through the resources supplied by logic and mathematics alone, but further philosophical considerations (related, in particular, to the philosophy of sciences) are needed as well. Notwithstanding this, particular cases can be frequently analyzed.
For instance, with regard to C + as e.g. S4, is complementary to this very logic. Suppose that we have the usual absolutely free algebra of propositions P = hP ; h!;^; _; :ii, and the usual corresponding classical notion of deduction`K. Now, consider the algebra P( ) = hP ; h!;^; _; ii, and suppose that obeys the rules of the weak negation of C + 1 . C + 1 is a conservative extension of K, in the sense that the restriction of`C+ 1 to P is`K. But the interesting point to know is whether, when de ning the strong negation as we have done, we get the`same' negation as the one which was already there. In C 1 , :a is logically equivalent to a^ (a^ a). But this property is not very satisfactory, for we cannot replace, in C 1 , one of this proposition by the other; for instance, :a is not logically equivalent to ( a^ (a^ a)). But in C + 1 , we can accomplish this, using the fact that :a and a^ (a^ a) are congruent formulas, as de ned in 3.5.2.
Therefore, the conclusion is that C + 1 is really an extension of classical logic, which (in this sense) complements it. Within C + 1 , we can deal with all we have been dealing with in classical logic, with no alterations, and furthermore, we can use a weak negation which permits us to make some extra patterns of reasoning as well.
However, we should note that, in general, the very distinction between rivalry and complementarity in connection to non-classical logics is something not precise, and a detailed examination of this issue depends on the particular formulations such a distinction receives. There are certainly circumstances, nevertheless, in which one can employ paraconsistent logic, and in which classical logic cannot be applied (for instance, in the semantical analysis of some paradoxes, such as Russell's: Russell's set exists in some paraconsistent set theories). In this sense, paraconsistent logic is rival to classical one.
The big question, however, is to know whether our world is in fact contradictory or not, and such a question was not de nitively answered yet.
Anyway, in connection to this question, there are those who claim that paraconsistent logic is rival mainly because of the existence of some`true contradictions' (cf. 34] ). But what are the exact connections between the problematic rival/complementary and the belief in the existence or non-existence of contradictions? For instance, Priest and Routley seem to believe that true contradictions entail that paraconsistent logic is a rival logic. As far as we see it, nonetheless, and in conformity with what we have just remarked, independently of a commitment to this kind of contradiction, paraconsistent logic may be conceived, in certain contexts, as a rival one. However, we shall not pursue this issue further here.
A nal word. We should note that there are in nitely many non-equivalent paraconsistent logical systems. In this respect, the situation is similar to that of modal logic. On the other hand, as it was already mentioned above, paraconsistent logic has given rise to various important developments in philosophy, mathematics, the empirical sciences as well as technology.
For details, one may consult, for instance, 3, 25] (both of these interesting and highly informative papers { which were extensively used in order to articulate the historical outline presented in Section 1 above as well as the present philosophical remarks { contain a rather detailed list of bibliographical references) 34, 2, 28, 32] . For an overview, see 22].
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